The Economics of Mandatory Security Breach Reporting to Authorities
Schlüsselwörter
Mandatory security breach reporting; interdependent security; information asymmetry; principal-agent theory; security audits
Zitieren als
Laube, S., & Böhme, R. (2015). The Economics of Mandatory Security Breach Reporting to Authorities. In Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), Delft, Netherlands. (accepted / in press (not yet published))Details
Publikationstyp
Forschungsartikel in Sammelband (Konferenz)
Begutachtet
Ja
Publikationsstatus
accepted / in press (not yet published)
Jahr
2015
Konferenz
14th Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS)
Konferenzort
Delft, Netherlands
Sprache
Englisch
Gesamter Text